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est excusio alterius,30 but it is not satisfactory where there is a pecuniary
loss to the estate arising out of one of these forms of action. A more
logical revision would be to eliminate any reference to survival based on
the form of the action, but to refer instead to the type of injury in ques-
tion. The present Indiana act names "medical, hospital and nursing ex-
pense and loss of income" as injuries to be recovered, but this list does
not exhaust the type of injuries which could cause diminution of the de-
cedent's estate. Attorneys' fees arising from false imprisonment or ma-
licious prosecution, or a damage to a property interest arising from an
invasion of privacy" are examples of such injuries not provided for by the
terminology in the present statute. Rather than enumerate various types
of injuries which diminish the decedent's estate and which should thus
survive, the statute should merely state that only those injuries causing
pecuniary loss to the estate should survive.
ADMISSIBILITY IN INDIANA OF DECLARATIONS MADE
BEFORE OR AFTER EXECUTION OF A WILL
An exception to the hearsay rule permits a declaration by a declarant
concerning his then-existent state of mind to be admitted into evidence as
proof of his mental state at the time of the declaration.' This exception
has been extended, under certain circumstances to allow such declarations
into evidence as a basis for the inference that the then-existent state of
mind produced subsequent conduct in accordance with that state of mind ;'
declarations also have been admitted, but to a much lesser extent, to infer
previous conduct.3 Even though the courts have been reluctant to expand
this exception, declarations by a testator uttered before and after the ex-
36. In Gray v. Wallace, 319 S.W.2d 582 (Mo. Sup. Ct. 1958) the action was for
malicious prosecution. Under the Missouri survival act, Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 537.020-.030
(1953), actions for slander, libel, assault and battery and false imprisonment were
specifically excluded from survival. Nevertheless, the action for malicious prosecution
was held to survive due to the legislature's failure to specifically name it in the statute.
37. Continental Optical Co. v. Reed, 119 Ind. App. 643, 86 N.E.2d 306 (1949).
1. A brief discussion of declarations of mental state is found in McCormick, Evi-
dence 567-578 (1954).
2. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hillmon, 145 U.S. 285 (1892) ; Atherton v. Gaslin, 194
Ky. 460, 239 S.W. 771 (1922).
3. Whitlow v. Durst, 20 Cal. 2d 523, 127 P.2d 530 (1942); Moyer v. Moyer, 64
Utah 260, 228 Pac. 911 (1924) ; Atherton v. Gaslin, 194 Ky. 460, 239 S.W. 771 (1922).
But most courts would probably argue as Justice Cardozo did in Shepard v. United
States, 290 U.S. 96, 105, 106 (1933), where he said: "Declarations of intention, casting
light upon the future, have been sharply distinguished from declarations of memory,
pointing backwards to the past. There would be an end, or nearly that, to the rule
against hearsay if the distinction were ignored."
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
ecution of a will have been consistently admitted in some jurisdictions.-
The cases on the question, in nearly all jurisdictions, seem confused, but
many of the problems would disappear if the courts properly distinguished
the different purposes for which the declarations are offered into evi-
dence.5 When analyzing the Indiana law in relation to the admissibility
of a testator's declarations in a will contest, one should keep in mind not
only these purposes, but also the necessity for admitting such declarations
and the declarant's trustworthiness in making them.
An allegation of undue influence or fraud is present in most of the
contested will cases in which the admissibility of a testator's declarations
is in issue. The Indiana Supreme Court has emphatically stated that
"declarations of a testator, not made contemporaneously with the execu-
tion of a will, are not admissible for the purpose of showing that the will
was procured by undue influence."'  If the declarations are offered as
direct evidence of the truth of undue influence or fraud, the Indiana
courts say that they are merely hearsay and do not fall within any of the
exceptions.' This position seems to be in accord with the weight of
authority.8 The supreme court has said that "this rule also applies to
written declarations of the testator, as letters written by him and other
wills executed by him."9
Although declarations not made at the time of execution are in-
admissible as direct proof of undue influence, they are admissible to show
the testator's state of mind, feelings, affections and mental capacity."
4. McCormick, op. cit. supra note 1, at 573 and 577, 578.
5. Wigmore has classified the utterances of a testator as follows: "(1) That he
does or does not intend to make a will of a particular tenor; (2) That he has or has not
nade a will of a particular tenor; (3) That he has or has not made a will, or that a
particular will is or is not in existence, or is or is not genuhte; (4) That a particular
will has or has not been destroyed or otherwise revoked; (5) That a particular will
was procured by fraud or undiute influence; (6) That certain persons have been or are
the object of his affection or dislike; and (7) Utterances indicating insanity, mental
feebleness, or the like." 6 WIGMiORE, EVIDENCE § 1734 (3rd ed. 1940) (hereinafter cited
as WIGM'E).
6. Hayes v. West, 37 Ind. 21, 24 (1871).
7. Allman v. Malsbury, 224 Ind. 177, 65 N.E.2d 106 (1946) ; Loeser v. Simpson,
219 Ind. 572, 39 N.E.2d 945 (1942) ; Emry v. Beaver, 192 Ind. 471, 137 N.E. 55 (1922) ;
Jones v. Beasley, 191 Ind. 209, 131 N.E. 225 (1921); Robbins v. Fugit, 189 Ind. 165,
126 N.E. 321 (1920); Ditton v. Hart, 175 Ind. 181, 93 N.E. 961 (1911) ; Westfall v.
Wait, 165 Ind. 353, 73 N.E. 1089 (1905); Conway v. Vizzard, 122 Ind. 266, 23 N.E.
771 (1890) ; Vanvalkenberg v. Vanvalkenberg, 90 Ind. 433 (1883) ; Todd v. Fenton, 66
Ind. 25 (1878) ; Bunday v. McKnight, 48 Ind. 502 (1874) ; Hayes v. West, 37 Ind. 21(1871) ; Runkle v. Gates, 11 Ind. 95 (1858) ; Evans v. Evans, 121 Ind. App. 104, 96
N.E.2d 688 (1951).
8. 6 WIGa ORE § 1738.
9. Ditton v. Hart, 175 Ind. 181, 189, 190, 93 N.E. 961, 965 (1911).
10. Allman v. Malsbury, 224 Ind. 177, 65 N.E.2d 106 (1946) ; Emry v. Beaver, 192
Ind. 471, 137 N.E. 55 (1922); Robbins v. Fugit, 189 Ind. 165, 126 N.E. 321 (1920);
Ditton v. Hart, 175 Ind. 181, 93 N.E. 961 (1911); Staser v. Hogan, 120 Ind. 207, 21 N.E.
911 (1889); Rice v. Rice, 92 Ind. App. 640, 175 N.E. 540 (1931).
NOTES
Thus, if there is some independent evidence of undue influence, declara-
tions of a testator made before or after the execution of a will may be
proper, not as evidence that the undue influence was actually exerted, but
as evidence of the testator's susceptibility to deception or his incapacity
to resist importunities." These declarations are admissible to show the
effect of such acts on the testator and are used as a basis for inferring
his mental state at the time of the execution. In one early case," the In-
diana Supreme Court admitted the testator's declarations which indicated
that his memory was failing and that his son had great influence over
his conduct. The court felt that "it was proper to show the condition of
the testator's mind at any time, to enable the jury to determine its condi-
tion at the date of the will" and "to show what influence, if any, the son
had over the testator, under the issue that the will was procured by un-
due influence."" The testator's state of mind, feelings, and affections
also indicate a standard by which his conduct at the time of the execution
can be tested. In order to establish the testator's normal tendencies, state-
ments indicating his state of mind, feelings, and affections are relevant. 4
This rationale is illustrated in one Indiana case where a will was made in
conformity with prior declarations; the supreme court admitted the dec-
larations as evidence tending to rebut an undue influence attack."
Declarations concerning the testator's susceptibility to deception, in-
capacity to resist pressure and normal tendencies are admitted whether
before or after execution of the will. The strongest argument in favor
of the admissibility of such utterances is necessity"s since "it very rarely
occurs that this state of mind can be shown by declarations made at the
very moment of the execution of the will."' 7  The distinction between
declarations that are direct evidence of the truth of undue influence or
fraud and those that merely show the condition of mind is indeed subtle,
if not impossible. Wigmore realized this:
It is doubtful if often they amount to anything more than logi-
cal quibbles which a Supreme Court may lay hold of for order-
ing a new trial where justice on the whole seems to demand it.
It would seem more sensible to listen to all the utterances of a
11. Ramseyer v. Dennis, 187 Ind. 420, 116 N.E. 417 (1918) ; Goodbar v. Lidikey,
136 Ind. 1, 35 N.E. 691 (1893) ; Staser v. Hogan, 120 Ind. 207, 21 N.E. 911 (1889)
Rice v. Rice, 92 Ind. App. 640, 175 N.E. 540 (1931).
12. Staser v. Hogan, 120 Ind. 207, 21 N.E. 911 (1889).
13. Id. at 217, 21 N.E. at 914.
14. Lamb v. Lamb, 105 Ind. 456, 5 N.E. 171 (1885).
15. Goodbar v. Lidikey, 136 Ind. 1, 35 N.E. 691 (1893).
16. Enry v. Beaver, 192 Ind. 471, 137 N.E. 55 (1922) ; Ramseyer v. Dennis, 187
Ind. 420, 116 N.E. 417 (1918) ; Rice v. Rice, 92 Ind. App. 640, 175 N.E. 540 (1931).
17. Rice v. Rice, 92 Ind. App. 640, 645, 175 N.E. 540, 541 (1931).
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testator, without discrimination as to the admissibility, and
then to leave them to the jury with careful instructions how to
use them. 8
The Indiana law is more definite when a will is attacked on the
ground of unsoundness of mind or insanity of the testator at the time of
execution of the will. The statements made by a testator before, after,
or contemporaneously with, such execution are admissible as tending to
show his mental capacity to make a will at the time of its execution."0
This position seems justified by necessity. Post-testamentary declara-
tions, however, should not be admitted when the testator states that he
was insane because there is no present mental condition from which a
prior mental condition can be inferred.2"
The Indiana courts also have been definite when the matter of due
execution is in issue, but here they have refused to admit the testator's
declarations.21  In Barger v. Barger," a will was attacked on the ground
that it was forged. The defendant offered to prove that after the date of
the execution of the will, the decedent said that he had made a will. The
court stated that when such declarations "are offered as evidence of the
primary fact of execution, contents, or revocation, they are hearsay and
are generally excluded."2" The court went on to say, "it is clear .
that in all of our decisions it has been concluded that such declarations
were not admissible to prove the execution of the instrument, and that is
the purpose for which they were offered here. ' 24  The court's position
might be tenable in situations where there is prima facie a valid will and
it is merely attacked by declarations of the testator that are inconsistent
with it; but in situations where the declarations substantiate other evi-
18. 6 WIGMORE § 1738. This section deals with a testator's statements as to undue
influence or fraud in will cases.
19. Allman v. Malsbury, 224 Ind. 177, 65 N.E.2d 106 (1946) ; Emry v. Beaver, 192
Ind. 471, 137 N.E. 55 (1922); Robbins v. Fugit, 189 Ind. 165, 126 N.E. 321 (1920);
Ditton v. Hart, 175 Ind. 181, 93 N.E. 961 (1911) ; Bower v. Bower, 142 Ind. 194, 41
N.E. 523 (1895); Hayes v. West, 37 Ind. 21 (1871). At times the Indiana Supreme
Court has over-stated its position. For instance, in Vanvalkenberg v. Vanvalkenberg, 90
Ind. 433, 438 (1883), the court stated that the testator's declarations made at times other
than at the execution of the will "are admissible for no purpose except upon the question
of his mental capacity to make a will." This is not an accurate statement because such
declarations are admitted for other purposes.
20. 6 WIGMORE § 1740.
21. Allman v. Malsbury, 224 Ind. 177, 197, 65 N.E.2d 106, 114 (1946) (the court
made the broad statement that "statements of the testator made at any time other than
at the time of execution are not competent on any issues except the one of unsoundness
of mind") ; Barger v. Barger, 221 Ind. 530, 48 N.E.2d 813 (1943) ; Hayes v. West, 37
Ind. 21 (1871).
22. 221 Ind. 530, 48 N.E.2d 813 (1943).
23. Id. at 533, 48 N.E.2d at 814.
24. Id. at 535, 48 N.E.2d at 815.
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dence, such as the will itself, they should be admitted. This latter posi-
tion was taken by the Kentucky Court of Appeals in a will contest based
on the sole ground of forgery.2" The court held that both ante-
testamentary and post-testamentary declarations" were admissible in
corroboration of other evidence tending to show the genuineness of the
will. This would seem to be the better position on all questions involving
due execution."7
A multitude of problems arise when a will has been lost or destroyed.
Not only the prior existence of the will, but also its contents, must be
determined. Further, if the testator retains possession of his will and
upon his death it cannot be found, the law presumes that it has been
revoked.25 In one proceeding which was initiated to establish a lost
will,25 the testimony indicated that the testatrix had told numerous people
that she "had given her entire estate to the girls." Upon her death the
will could not be found, but it was last seen in her possession. The court
said that this "gives an inference or presumption of its destruction by
the decedent, which presumption must be overcome by sufficient evi-
dence."2" The court allowed the post-testamentary declarations concern-
ing the disposition of the estate to the girls to come into evidence, but in
this case they were not sufficient to overcome the presumption of revo-
cation. The presumption of revocation in lost will situations may be re-
butted, however, where a testator tells others that he made a will and
left it in the custody of another person."'
25. Atherton v. Gaslin, 194 Ky. 460, 293 S.W. 771 (1922).
26. It seems that no distinction should be made between ante-testamentary and
post-testamentary declarations when the question of forgery is in issue. If the date of
the will were used to determine which declarations would be admitted and which would
not, a forger could pick a "conveient" date and be assured that certain relevant declara-
tions would be excluded from evidence.
27. The Indiana statute on execution of wills reads as follows: "The execution of
a will, other than nuncupative will, must be by the signature of the testator and of at
least two [2] witnesses as follows:
(a) The testator shall signify to the attesting witnesses that the instrument is his
will and either (1) Himself sign, or (2) Acknowledge his signature already made, or
(3) At his discretion and in his presence have someone else sign his name for him, and(4) In any of the above cases the act must be done in the presence of two [2] or more
attesting witnesses.
(b) The attesting witnesses must sign (1) In the presence of the testator, and
(2) In the presence of each other." IND. ANN. STAT. § 6-503 (Burns 1953).
28. McDonald v. McDonald, 142 Ind. 55, 41 N.E. 336 (1895); Fye v. Hamilton, 75
Ind. App. 99, 129 N.E. 237 (1920).
29. Fye v. Hamilton, 75 Ind. App. 99, 129 N.E. 237 (1920).
30. Id. at 106, 129 N.E. at 239.
31. Such a situation did arise in Gfroerer v. Gfroerer, 173 Ind. 424, 90 N.E. 757
(1910), where a testatrix told witnesses that she had made a will and left it with a
scrivener to keep for her. There was no evidence that she later called upon him for the
will. The scrivener testified that he had never parted with the custody of it; neverthe-
less, he could not find it. The court found in favor of the parties who had sought to
establish the existence of such will.
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In McDonald v. McDonald,2 the court held that post-testamentary
declarations were admissible to show the contents of a lost or destroyed
will and its non-revocation. In the words of the court:
It is settled in this State that the declarations of a testator, made
at a time other than when the will was executed, are not admis-
sible in an action of contest upon the issue of fraud, or undue
influence. . . . But it is evident, we think, from the instruc-
tions of the court to the jury, that the declarations were ad-
mitted in evidence, and the jury permitted to consider them for
the purpose only of showing the contents of the alleged lost or
destroyed will, and whether, if such a will ever existed, it re-
mained unrevoked at the death of the testator.3 3
Despite the language of the supreme court in McDonald, the Indiana Ap-
pellate Court has held that post-testamentary declarations concerning the
provisions of a lost will are competent only "if sufficiently definite, by
way of coroboration in the furnishing of the clear proof by two wit-
nesses of the provisions of the will, as matters of fact within their
knowledge, which is required by the statute."3  Further, in the Barger
case, the supreme court, in dictum, indicated that such declarations are
generally excluded when offered as the primary fact of contents or
revocation.
It seems that on grounds of necessity, all related declarations of the
testator on the issues of existence, contents or revocation of lost wills
should be admitted into evidence, at least when given in corroboration of
direct evidence. The courts, of course, must use some caution because,
as the court, in McDonald, pointed out, the statements "are sometimes
made by [the testator] . . . for the express purpose of misleading or
satisfying curious friends or expectant relatives."3 If both the elements
of trustworthiness and necessity are present, and they usually are in lost
32. 142 Ind. 55, 41 N.E. 336 (1895). In this case, an action was brought to set
aside what was alleged to be a pretended will of the deaceased. The contention of the
plaintiffs was that the true will of the deceased had been lost or stolen, and that the
will in contest was substituted for the missing one. The court, in setting aside the will
in contest, admitted into evidence certain statements made by the testator to his law
partner concerning the existence and contents of the testator's will. The court said:
"If the declarations of the testator are legitimate evidence to prove the contents in a
proceeding to have a lost will admitted to probate, which the authortiies, we think, seem
to fully authorize and support, in reason they must equally so under the issues in the
case at bar, to show the contents of the lost will in question, in order that the interest
of the appellees in the estate might appear, and the presumption of revocation rebutted."
142 Ind. at 84, 41 N.E. at 346.
33. Id. at 81, 82, 41 N.E. at 345.
34. Inlow v. Hughes, 38 Ind. App. 375, 395, 396, 76 N.E. 763, 769, 770 (1906).
35. 142 Ind. at 84, 41 N.E. at 345.
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will situations, then the McDonald rationale should be followed.
The problem of revocation is somewhat different when the will has
not been lost or destroyed. In Indiana, as in most jurisdictions, there
are statutory requirements pertaining to the manner of revocation ;6 thus,
a parol revocation of a will by a testator's declarations is not sufficient
to satisfy the statute. But where there has been an act of revocation by
mutilation, cancellation, alteration, or destruction of the will, declara-
tions both before and after the act should be admitted to show the intent
of the testator at the time of the act. 7
As the above discussion indicates, the Indiana law does not provide
a pat answer as to whether a testator's declarations, made before or after
the execution of a will, will be admitted into evidence. The Indiana
courts, however, as well as courts in otfier jurisdictions, have not hesi-
tated to nibble at the hearsay rule in will cases. This is especially true
when post-testamentary declarations are in question. In most fields, the
cases indicate that declarations which look backward are more likely to
be colored than those which look forward. Perhaps this is true since the
risk of recollection is involved in the former and not in the latter. Also,
since there has been more time for reflection when post-testamentary
declarations are involved, it is argued that the motivation towards false-
hood may be stronger. Nevertheless, the will cases in Indiana, for the
most part, have treated ante-testamentary and post-testamentary declara-
tions in the same manner.
When undue influence or fraud is in issue in a contested will case,
the Indiana courts have refused to admit into evidence any declarations
of a testator, not made contemporaneously with the execution of the will,
if such declarations are offered as direct evidence of the truth of undue
influence or fraud. The courts will admit these declarations, however,
if they are offered, not as direct proof of the truth of undue influence
or fraud, but rather, to show the testator's state of mind, feelings and
36. The Indiana statute reads as follows: "Manner of Revocation-Republica-
tion.-No will in writing, nor any part thereof, except as in this act provided, shall be
revoked, unless the testator, or some other person in his presence and by his direction,
with intent to revoke, shall destroy or mutilate the same; or such testator shall execute
other writing for that purpose, signed, subscribed and attested as required in section 503[§ 6-503]. A will can be revoked in part only by the execution of a writing as herein
provided. And if, after the making of any will, the testator shall execute a second, a
revocation of the second shall not revive the first will, unless it shall appear by the
terms of such revocation to have been his intent to revive it, or unless, after such revo-
cation, he shall duly republish the previous will." IND. ANN. STAT. § 6-506 (Burns.
1953).
37. 6 Wir Eo § 1737.
38. The various issues involved in this note have been probate issues; there has
been no attempt to discuss the admissibility of a testator's declarations to aid in the
construction of a will.
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affections. They are used as evidence of the testator's susceptibility to
deception, incapacity to resist pressures, and normal tendencies. If un-
soundness of mind or insanity is the issue in question, the Indiana courts
will admit both types of declarations. If the question of due execution is
involved, the Indiana courts have refused to allow either into evidence.
A better position has been taken by the Kentucky courts where both ante-
testamentary and post-testamentary declarations are admissible when
used to corroborate other evidence. The Indiana decisions have not
been consistent in cases pertaining to lost or destroyed wills; such cases
usually involve a question of revocation, non-revocation, or contents.
One theory is that the declarations are admissible; another is that they
are admissible only if used in corroboration of other evidence; a third is
that they should be excluded when offered as direct proof of contents or
revocation. Despite the dictum in the Barger case, the Indiana courts
have tended to adopt the first or second theory. The hearsay prohibi-
tion is weakening in will cases-representing a desired trend. The trust-
worthiness and necessity of a testator's declarations should be more de-
terminative than whether such declarations fall within an exception to
the hearsay rule.
